[This guest post comes courtesy of Ben Hough, a Masters student on the Environment, politics and globalisation course. Ben talks here about his dissertation and how trust is a key factor for the public when it comes to fracking. The views presented do not necessarily reflect those of King’s Sustainability]
In light of the government’s abrupt U-turn on hydraulic fracturing (aka fracking) back in January, David Cameron may be starting to regret his pledge to go “all out for shale”. But could he realistically have anticipated the level of public opposition to this new technology, especially given its ‘success’ in the USA and its much hyped potential to reduce our energy bills and dependence on Russian gas? And if so, how could his coalition government have handled the process differently and what lessons can be learnt?
Fracking is a technology which enables the extraction of natural gas from onshore formations of low permeability shale rock through the injection of water, sand and chemicals. The vast quantities of the availability of this gas has already triggered a domestic energy boom in the USA, and other governments, including in the UK, want to follow suit. Whilst the process itself has been around for some time, it is the potent combination of fracking and innovations in horizontal drilling techniques which have vastly increased the scale of the industry in recent years, pleasing its proponents and upsetting environmentalists in equal measure.
In terms of a new technology, fracking shares similarities with other energy and extractive industries, particularly those in their early stages in which; “failures cannot meaningfully be anticipated in advance in the safety of a laboratory…” Beebeejaun (2013). As the nuclear industry has shown, the real world occasionally presents scenarios for which no adequate contingency plans have been made. Events such as the tsunami triggered meltdown at Fukushima in March 2011 and the fracking triggered ‘earthquakes’ in Lancashire a month later inevitably intensify public concern about the safety of such technologies. Accordingly, whilst geologists typically identify a negligible direct risk to people and the environment from fracking, based on the limited quantitative evidence available, the public include subjective qualities in their assessments and so are much more cautious. The fact that the government failed to anticipate or effectively respond to this fear has ultimately created more resistance, but has hopefully provided a valuable public relations lesson for the future at least.
The discrepancy between lay and expert judgement also highlights the issue of public trust, particularly in the institutions which undertake, regulate and resist fracking. Typically, if knowledge is deficient (as with fracking), the public must rely on information and assurances from other parties when forming opinions about the risks associated with new technologies and hence the groups they choose to trust and the extent of trust are crucial for acceptance. Studies on a range of industries (including nuclear power, carbon capture & storage and chemical processing) have consistently shown that when the public have greater trust in the organisations responsible for their operation and oversight they perceive more benefits and fewer risks. Conversely, where trust is low, risk perception increases. A survey on this relationship undertaken for my dissertation found that the same logic applies to fracking, with those exhibiting lower trust levels in the government and fracking companies also perceiving greater risks overall. Although this is probably no surprise, it does suggest that if the mind-set of the British populace currently opposed to fracking is to be changed, the government should work on restoring trust. Whilst this is easier said than done, results from the survey suggest that if more weight was accorded to the assessments of the British Geological Survey in government communications (rated 2nd for trustworthiness out of 19 organisations and the lead independent organisation for fracking research in Britain), the public may be more inclined to accept a measured pro-fracking message.
The survey also looked at different types of trust, asking respondents to rate the government’s management of fracking in terms of the information provided, the regulatory framework, risk reduction, the public consultation process and overall honesty. When averaged across the sample they failed to score well in any of these categories but were rated lowest for their consultation efforts; hardly surprising considering that results from an earlier question revealed that only a quarter of respondents had been aware of a three month national consultation, purportedly set up to address the public’s environmental concerns. This is significant not only for the unacceptably small proportion that were aware the process had taken place, but more because the implication in the subsequent report that the public had had ample opportunity to voice their concerns was rather disingenuous. Indeed, the value of a consultation which engages only a small fraction of the population is dubious and leaves you wondering how many other consultations on similarly contentious issues you might have missed. Having said that, results from a later consultation on the proposal to give oil and gas companies underground access without securing landowner permission first, showed that over 90% (out of over 40,000 respondents) were against the idea, but were ignored by the government who went ahead with the changes anyway.
Aligning with Karen Bakker’s concept of an ‘uncooperative commodity’, the extraction of onshore natural gas by fracking creates issues for the public which are quite distinct from those generated by the offshore fossil fuel industry. Specifically, the removal of land rights to facilitate the extensive horizontal drilling required to make fracking economically viable (referred to previously), the resistance of shale gas to production (exemplified by the ‘earthquakes’) and the risk of ground and surface water contamination from methane and fracking fluids (already observed in the USA) have created new grounds for opposition qualitatively different from those arising during the development of North Sea oil and gas. Whether these concerns are founded on evidence or not, they should be addressed sensitively by government if strong opposition is to be overcome.
Finally, the emergence of fracking at such a crucial point in the fight against climate change must surely generate contradictions that even its fiercest proponents would struggle to resolve. The industry and government line is that gas will replace dirtier coal and oil and enable a transition to a cleaner energy future, but surveys (including mine) suggest the public are not convinced. There is a danger also that the prominent role the UK has made for itself in EU and global climate policy will be sacrificed if investment for renewables is stalled by the cheap supply of domestic gas which fracking provides, although there remains considerable doubt that the reserves will live up to optimistic industry estimates.
Whilst the concessions attained earlier this year are certainly significant, many environmentalists insist they do not go far enough and fracking looks likely to remain a significant political issue for the foreseeable future. Whether or not the level of opposition the government is now experiencing could have been prevented by a more participatory and democratic approach to the issue is unclear. However, I expect David Cameron will be a little less zealous about his support for similar new technologies in the future, certainly before the public has had a chance to express its approval.
