Call for papers, Uncategorized

Call for Papers

 The KSLR EU Law Blog hereby invites you to submit abstracts for blog posts on

 any area of EU law

 (including but not limited to judicial protection, internal market, external relations, financial regulation, data-protection, environmental policies).

Submissions covering any of the following topics are particularly welcome:

  • The future of the EU: reflections and reforms
  • The external dimension of EU policies
  • The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its application at EU and national level
  • Protecting and enhancing the rule of law in the EU
  • Issues of law or policy of Member States with relevance for the EU

We also invite submissions on:

  • Coverage of EU law-related events
  • Reviews of recently published EU law-related books as well as
  • Recent developments of EU case law

We are looking for 800 – 2000 words articles.

Please refer to our style guidelines.

Please send abstracts or full articles to giulia.gentile@kcl.ac.uk and luigi.lonardo@kcl.ac.uk by 20 February 2018.

We look forward to hearing from you!

The KSLR EU Law Blog Editorial Team

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Europe.think.again – Call for Ideas

Dear All,

The KSLR EU Law Blog is pleased to share with you a EU-related project managed by “Foraus Global”, a Swiss think tank on foreign policy.

In view of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community on 25 March 2017, Foraus Global is publishing a short collection of ideas to reform European cooperation.

For more information, please visit the following page: europe.think.again project.

If you are interested in participating or you have further questions, please contact Laura Knopfel (laura.knopfel@kcl.ac.uk). 

We look forward to hearing from you!

The KSLR EU Law Blog editorial team

 

Uncategorized

KSLR Brexit Series

The KSLR EU Blog is pleased to announce that over the next few weeks it will publish a series of articles on the EU referendum and the possibility of Britain leaving the EU (‘Brexit’).  We’ll look at issues such as Ireland’s experience with referendums on EU matters, how other Union members and the USA view ‘Brexit’, the legal technicalities of the referendum which are causing arguments between the ‘In’ and ‘Out’ camps and a review of the new book Britain Alone: The Implications and Consequences of the UK Exit from the EU. 
We’ll kick off today with Anne Wesemann’s post : ‘IN or OUT – WIN or LOSE? Who is really going to feel the Brexit?’

 

Uncategorized

Article 106(1) TFEU ready for duty again; the CJEU’s judgment in the DEI case

Jose Manuel Panero Rivas
MA in Economics for Competition Law, King’s College London, LL.M in European Law, College of Europe, Bruges

On 17 July 2014 the Court of Justice (CJEU) delivered its much awaited judgment in the DEI case.[1] This was a very important case for the future of Article 106(1) TFEU, and the CJEU’s judgment certainly met expectations.

Continue reading “Article 106(1) TFEU ready for duty again; the CJEU’s judgment in the DEI case”

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Case Comment: C-423/12 Reyes

 

Re-posted from the Eutopia Law Blog

 

Adrienne Yong

PhD Candidate at King’s College London

 

The recent developments in EU citizenship have been admittedly fairly quiet in comparison to the uproar after the ever controversial Zambrano case where the interpretation of citizenship provisions under Article 21 TFEU went astray. In the case of Reyes, the question concerns a clarification on the Directive 2004/38 and the meaning of ‘dependant’ under Art 2(2)(c). The case concerns third country nationals (TCNs), the cases of which have dominated the scene since Zambrano. The persistence of claimants in this respect is thus admirable, suggesting that Zambrano and indeed, the Directive itself, left a lot to be desired. This persistent pattern is to be received positively, representing good opportunities to clarify confusing positions.

Facts

Ms. Reyes, a Filipina, was brought up by her grandmother in the Philippines when she was three years old after her mother left to work in Germany to support her family. Ms. Reyes’ mother is now a German citizen.

Throughout her life, Ms. Reyes never held a job but similarly never relied on the Philippines’ social benefits. Her mother periodically sent money to support her, her sisters and her grandmother. Ms. Reyes’ mother moved to Sweden to be with a Norwegian man in 2009, whom she married mid-2011. He received a retirement pension which was also sent to the Philippines for Ms. Reyes’ benefit. After moving, Ms. Reyes’ mother did not work, living on her husband’s retirement.

When Ms. Reyes entered the Schengen area early 2011, she was refused a residence permit as dependent family member by the Swedish Migrationsverket for being unable to prove the funds sent by her mother and her partner were to sustain her life in the Philippines (in the form of basic needs, lodging, healthcare) or that any home state public funds were supporting her. This was due to the fact that she was fully dependent on her grandmother and the Migrationsverket decided this indicated she was not dependent on her mother in Sweden.

The appeal by Ms. Reyes to the Migrationsverket was dismissed because whilst they agreed her basic needs were supported by her mother’s funds, there was not enough proof that she would be able to survive without dependence on her mother and partner if she were to remain in her home state. They argued that she was still young, had qualifications from there, lived there, and still had relatives there. Her mother’s choice to support her was not determinative in the decision that Ms. Reyes’ was not dependent.

The first question referred thus aims to clarify if Art 2(2)(c) Directive 2004/38 – the definition of a dependent family member – requires that those over 21 years old must prove that they had searched for employment and failed OR sought support from public funds and it was also not possible before being considered a family member. The second asks if this family member can still be considered a ‘dependant’ if they are considered to be fairly well qualified to get employment AND intends to find a job in that Member State. This would nullify the conditions under which they would be a dependent relative.

CJEU judgment

In 16 short paragraphs, the Court of Justice of the European Union makes a concise and very coherent decision on Ms. Reyes’ situation.

Seemingly considering the Opinion of AG Mengozzi, the Court referred to Jia, where the situation concerned the definition of a ‘dependant’ for over-21 year olds. The standard would be a situation of ‘real dependence’ which must be construed broadly. This is somewhat justified and explained by AG Mengozzi in that whilst the free movement of persons telos is not primarily to maintain family unity, this reasoning does not seem to have been totally ignored. It supports the broad position taken by the Court in its judgment, deciding that the situation where Ms. Reyes’ mother periodically and consistently sent money to support her daughter’s life in her home state would be one of sufficient dependence. This is, furthermore, absent of any necessity to prove they have tried to find work or seek support from public funds to support themselves. This requirement would place an extra burden on the citizen, which is against the spirit of the fundamental freedom to move and reside. The Court is clear in applying Jia that Sweden were in breach of their obligations under the Treaty.

Regarding the definition of ‘dependant’, the decision is fairly self-explanatory. To deny a citizen the status of a dependant purely on the grounds of their intention and chances to seek employment in the Member State would be against Art 23, Directive 2004/38 which expressly protects the right of family to seek employment if they have residence, Lebon also cited. Therefore, this should not interfere with its definition.

Comment

AG Mengozzi places a significant emphasis on the interpretation of Directive 2004/38 in a broad and generous manner in terms of protection of family members and the rights they should derive from it. He draws upon the teleological perspectives of the provisions, which favour the unity of a family whether all Union citizens or not. Though recognisably different conclusions have been reached by the Court in the past in regards to similar questions, it would appear that the CJEU were convinced in this case that Directive 2004/38 should not be considered narrowly for Ms. Reyes’ situation.

Certainly, the judgment is not a surprising decision. Considering the importance of the right to freely move and reside, which includes employment opportunities for family as codified by Directive 2004/38, the case represents a hammering home of the definition of a ‘dependant’. Indeed, it goes to show that Member States cannot arbitrarily try to avoid their obligations to Union citizens’ families by way of minor technicalities and additional requirements.