On Politics and Law: the decision of “Karlsruhe”

Pierre-Antoine Klethi

LLM in EU Law Candidate, King’s College London; Master’s degree in European Economic Law, IEP Strasbourg and Science-Po Paris .

There was a lot of EU-related news on Wednesday 12th September 2012: besides the eagerly-awaited decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (located in Karlsruhe), J. M. Barroso addressed the European Parliament in his “State of Union” speech, and Dutch voters elected their new MPs.

This article will focus on the first event: the constitutional judges gave the green light to the German ratification of the TSCG (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) and of the ESM Treaty (European Stability Mechanism). They declared these two treaties compatible with the Grundgesetz, with some interpretation’s restrictions.

This decision was awaited not only by jurists, but also by political and economic circles. Let us take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the links between Politics and Law.

What are the outlines of the judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht?

The German constitutional judges have put two conditions to their approval of the ratification of the two European Treaties which had been challenged by several organisations and elects: the respect of the Parliament’s right to be informed and the respect of the Parliament’s fiscal sovereignty.

The constitutional court has recalled a former decision of September 7th, 2011 (on Greece’s rescue and on the EFSF), in which it stated that the decisions on public receipts and expenses had to be left to the Parliament, as it is an essential basis of the democratic self-determination process.

The judges have also specified that the Parliament would have to be consulted in case the current amount of loans and guarantees (around 190 billion euros for Germany) were to be exceeded. This means that automatic changes by European organs or by the ESM itself would not be compatible with the German constitution.

Furthermore, the German solidarity should benefit other countries only if the counterparties given by the latter are clearly determined. That way, the judges have excluded any “blank check” for other countries. Nevertheless, they have defined that the amounts must have a certain importance (which is the case, in the current situation). Besides, the Bundestag shall have the opportunity to control the good use of the granted funds.

Moreover, the Parliament must be sufficiently informed, without any limitation that could potentially result from the duty of discretion imposed on all ESM members and collaborators.

The judges want the two interpreting conditions (information and fiscal sovereignty of Parliament) to be guaranteed in the concerned treaties or, at least, in the ratification laws.

Apart from these two requirements, the federal constitutional court has declared that both treaties (TSCG and ESM Treaty) were compatible with the German constitution.

First, they have noticed that, if there was indeed a significant change in the functioning of the European and Monetary Union (EMU), the latter nevertheless continued to base on principles guaranteeing its stability, such as the independence of the ECB, the duty of fiscal discipline for all Member States and the national fiscal sovereignty (and responsibility). Article 136, §3 of the TFEU does not transfer new powers to the EU; it only opens the possibility to set up a stability mechanism. The effective establishing of such a mechanism requires the ratification of the Parliament. That way, there is still a potential for scrutiny.

The loss of voting rights for a country that does not meet its deadlines for payments to the ESM is not contrary to the Grundgesetz either, as the Parliament is responsible for fiscal decisions and, as such, has the duty to respect the commitments it has agreed to.

Furthermore, it is not proved that the maximal amount set for the German contribution (around 190 billion euros) exceeds what is bearable for the German budget. So, according to the judges, there is no reason to believe that this amount would lead the German fiscal sovereignty to become a void concept. Additionally, it was the Parliament’s competence to assess that the costs of contributing to the ESM were greater than those incurred in case of an absence of trans-European solidarity.

Moreover, the ESM Treaty must be interpreted in a manner compliant with the other EU Treaties. It is therefore excluded that the ESM could be used as a vehicle for States’ financing by the ECB. It is worth noting that the decision taken by the ECB on September 6th, 2012, to buy sovereign bonds on the secondary market, was not challenged in the frame of this case.

The constitutional court also specifies that the ratification laws of both treaties guarantee in a sufficient manner the Parliament’s implication on the national level and the sharing of competences within it (among the plenary, the budget commission and a special commission).

Regarding the TSCG, its content does not make a big difference with the constitutional limit of deficits (Schuldenbremse) and with the rules set in the TFEU. The TSCG does not foresee any intervention of EU organs in the national fiscal decision-making process: neither the competences of the European Commission, nor those of the European Court of Justice preclude the exercise of national sovereignty. And drawing inspiration from the yearly economic recommendations of the EU Council and the Commission does not imply transferring new competences to the EU; European rules on this matter are more institutional than material.

Finally, the constitutional judges remind us that the ratification of these treaties is not irreversible, in accordance with international custom.

Let us also note that the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not exclude changes in European or German (if appropriate, constitutional) law! By doing so, it shows that Law provides a structural and procedural framework for political decision-making, but does not impede evolutions.

On the relationship between Law and Politics

It is important to keep in mind that Law is fundamentally political: it is determined by democratically elected representatives.

As the German constitutional court puts it, Law provides a procedural framework, guidelines, and rules intended to make smooth political decision-making and life in society possible.

This framework has to retain some stability, some continuity. Yet, it should be able to evolve and adapt to the political and economic situation. It is not the judge’s role, in its judgements and decisions, to express political opinions aimed at keeping the current Law.

Meanwhile, elected representatives should not hide behind legal arguments to fight necessary political changes and to avoid difficult choices. In my opinion, it is in such a way that the recent decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht should be understood: the German constitutional judges are not against the European integration, they do not exclude a change in the (European or German) Law, but they require the respect of democratic guarantees, via the respect of the Parliament’s rights, and they want the elects to behave responsibly and to modify existing norms if they want to adopt a new political path.

 

Note: This article was originally published on September 13th, 2012 on the Europe’s Café blog (http://europecafe.wordpress.com/2012/09/13/on-politics-and-law-the-decision-of-karlsruhe/).

CALL FOR PAPERS – EU Law ***SELECTED PAPERS***

KSLR European Law Blog hereby invites you to submit abstracts proposing to cover topics on EU law.

 

We encourage submissions that would address issues regarding the recent developments of EU Law. Submissions may address –amongst other areas- recent legal developments; recent developments of case-law; EU law related political developments; innovative topics regulated by EU law; developments in EU countries of relevance to EU law; interactions between national, EU and international law; judicial cooperation in civil matters (EU); Conflict of laws (EU); or, EU competition Law.

Please submit abstracts of no more than 200 words by 14 October 2012 to <agne.limante@kcl.ac.uk> or belen.menchon_orduna@kcl.ac.uk.

The articles resulting from selected abstracts will be posted on KSLR European Law Blog website http://kslr.org.uk/blogs/europeanlaw/. Authors of selected abstracts will be informed by 30 October 2012. A full paper (1,500 to 2,000 words) should be submitted before 1 December 2012. The style guidelines may be found at http://kslr.org.uk/blogs/europeanlaw/about-us/ .

The call for papers is open to submissions from students and professionals from the UK and abroad.

 

 

SELECTED PAPERS

 

After reviewing all the interesting abstracts submitted for the Call for Papers, we are pleased to inform that the following papers have been selected:

  • Alexander Kamp : “A recent UK proposal on “opt-out” collective redress proceedings in private competition claims and the Brussels I Regulation”
  • Amanda Spalding: “Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: Where are we now?” and “Asylum Seekers Rights in the EU”
  • Gianni Lo Schiavo : “ Energy Efficiency in EU law at a conundrum? ”
  • Jelena Ganza: “Italian Golden Shares – a Never-Ending Story?”
  • Mehmed Yuseinov: “The Charter of Fundamental Rights: the ‘Bible’ of EU citizens’ rights or a voice crying in the wilderness?”
  • Nikolay Domanov: “How European are European elections” and “Nationalism and the European project”.

We appreciate all the effort from all the participants that have submitted their papers and encourage them to keep participating with the European Union Law Blog of the King’s Students Law Review in the future.

 

European Law Institute issues Statement on the Common European Sales Law

Recently a working party of the European Law Institute (the ELI) has published its Statement  on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Common European Sales Law. The report was approved and adopted by the European Law Institute on 7 September 2012.

According to the chairman of the working party,  Sir John Thomas, the working party’s starting point was that it would scrutinise the proposed Common European Sales Law within the policy framework set by the Commission. It has not therefore considered questions of policy, such as whether the Proposal should apply to consumer-to-consumer sales. It has focused its attention on issues of a more technical nature. The working party, and its report, therefore makes a number of significant recommendations aimed at improving the practical utility and attractiveness of the Proposal, rendering it simpler and more coherent and certain.

The report makes a number of recommendations both as to how the text of the Proposal can be improved to increase its practical utility, to maximise the prospect that as an optional law it will be used by consumers and businesses, and as to how it can be implemented successfully.

The ELI Statement can be found at: https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects/publications/

 

The ELI is an independent non-profit organisation made of leading European judges, lawyers and academics which was established to initiate, conduct and facilitate research, make recommendations and provide practical guidance in the field of European legal development.

 

A Third Way Out of the European Crisis

Jasper Doomen, J.D

M.A. in Philosophy (Leiden University, 2003); J.D. (Utrecht University, 2005)

Lecturer in law at Leiden University 

The European Monetary Union has been muddling on for a few years now, having to face serious problems and the solutions to which have been insufficiently incorporated into the initial agreements, perhaps from too optimistic a perspective. This has, in the wake of the debt crisis, meant – since far-reaching measures to remedy this defect are difficult to implement afterwards (requiring, after all, financial – and other – sacrifices) – that piecemeal steps have been taken. These have proven ineffective and in some cases even counterproductive. The latest such short-time response to the economic problems the European countries face consists in directly aiding banks that are in trouble; dissent has already emerged with regard to the details. The time has come to propose an alternative that is effective, workable and sustainable.

Hitherto the financial support was provided at the national level, which was hardly a successful approach, as one can now (with the benefit of hindsight) ascertain. Bypassing the national governments through a bank recapitalization is certainly a different but not necessarily a superior approach. Of course, banks will be supervised. Yet considering what is at stake, this outcome is downright disappointing (though not for everyone: Prime Minister Rajoy could barely hide his contentment – see http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xrg15x_spain-s-pm-rajoy-bank-rescue-deal-is-victory-for-euro_news). No structural solutions have been presented, or even a view towards accomplishing them.

More important, however, is the fact that the pressure on countries to implement reforms in order to combat the budget deficits has been reduced. That this is the outcome of the negotiations is not surprising. Discussing a solution with Spain and Italy resembles negotiating with someone who threatens to jump down a cliff while being chained to the other negotiators. His suicide or damage will have serious consequences for everyone else as well. These countries don’t want to go ‘bankrupt’ but they know their downfall will gravely affect the relatively strong countries, and they seem to have become experts in exploiting their stranglehold over them. This negotiation pattern is similar (if not virtually identical) to Greece’s strategy, and in the bleakest scenario, countries such as France will resort to it as well, especially with the current French president in place.

The dilemma is clear: the southern European countries have to economize while a large part of the population already faces grave financial problems. An additional problem for (northern) politicians is their credibility, which erodes with each concession they make. Hitherto Chancellor Merkel has stood her ground as a veritable contemporary Iron Lady, but this position will be difficult to maintain if enough countries are able to profit from Europe’s weaknesses (which are, ironically, the outcome of a desire to make Europe as a whole a strong organization; it seems, pace Lincoln, that a house divided against itself can stand, albeit unsteadily – incidentally, the comparison of north against south comes to mind).

How to resolve this impasse? Are there only two positions (either a United States of Europe or the road towards more sovereignty than is now the case, i.e., a return to the European Economic Community), or is a third option available? It has been proposed to grant countries loans only if they should provide some security, which has been ridiculed by some. It is unclear, however, why this could not be a workable procedure. The basic idea is that the countries that provide financial aid should receive control over state properties to the amount they have lent if the borrowers do not pay the money back. (I will not bother here with the details of how to calculate this or how this control should work if an invasion is considered undesirable.)

This control means that the lenders may use the profits that ensue from these properties (which may range from museum fees to gas revenues). Such profits are (fully or partly) paid to the borrowers if they sin no more and do what is demanded of them. In time, when their affairs are in order, they will be able to buy back the control of these properties. This means, effectively, a state of wardship. If this sounds harsh, consider that the alternative is that such states can continue imposing their will on the others until they will all share the same fate, waiting for China to take over the entire continent and sell it for scraps.

A general issue that must be addressed here is that of state sovereignty. The proposed solution seems to interfere inappositely with the room states have to deal with these matters. Yet clinging inflexibly to such a position means that states that do not keep their promises may simply use this as a shield, even if becomes too heavy for them to bear. Perhaps using a pliable concept of sovereignty, or something like the mitigated sovereignty that is applied in the U.S.A. (the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution specifies that the individual states have sovereign power over matters they have not delegated to the United States) would be desirable. Whether the European Union should, in time, be the equivalent of the U.S.A. is a controversial issue, even within countries (political parties defending very diverse views). An important difference in this regard between Europe and the U.S.A. is, in my view, the fact that the various European have long histories and cultures, a situation that was absent at the foundation of the U.S.A. They have, accordingly, potentially relatively much to lose if they should give up part of their sovereignty. I do not mean to estimate whether a further integration is desirable or not, but merely point out that one must make a choice. One cannot have one’s cake and eat it too (and eating someone else’s cake without recompense is disagreeable).

In any event, the new situation of additional control means that the power relationship is reversed, thus nullifying the ‘suicide’ threat. To use another simile: it is as if all countries share a boat together that continues to show new leaks which the southern countries are unwilling to mend, knowing that the northern countries have far more to gain from it than they do. This means, in the long run, that the boat (the European Monetary Union) may continue to exist but in a seriously weakened condition, which may still be considered preferable to the southern countries (in the short term, in any event) to carrying out the demands made by the northern countries, for the simple reason that all countries are in it together, so to speak. The solution amounts to dividing the boat in two (without resorting to dividing the Euro itself into two (or even more than two) currencies, which may be an – albeit costly – option in the worst scenario), so that it is in the benefit of the southern countries themselves to start working on making the necessary repairs, lest they wind up with nothing more than driftwood. The solution is, by the way, not without benefits for the countries in trouble themselves. Future loans can be granted relatively easily (because the lenders will have more security than is now the case), which means that the borrowers face fewer negative economic effects and can more easily ‘sell’ the new policy to their own populations.

The greatest problem remains that of enforceability. A ‘moral’ appeal on the borrowers to show solidarity with the lenders is equally nonsensical as one made to lenders to provide means in the first place, since this solidarity is as artificial as it gets (and thus meaningless). The alternative is to convince the politicians of the borrowers that a solid policy for the long-term is the only viable approach. In a democracy, with new elections constantly looming, such an appeal may fall on deaf ears, but the prospects of the erection of a statue in compensation for their great deeds may sufficiently appeal to their vanity.

In general, one must ask oneself whether a monetary union that wants to take itself seriously can afford to fail to propose clear and enforceable measures such as those suggested above.

 

The New European Consumer Agenda: improving consumer welfare through continued market integration

Robert Miklós Babirad

J.D. Masters Diploma candidate in EU Law, King’s College London; Post Graduate Diploma in EU Law (Merit); Member of the New York Bar

 

The new European Consumer Agenda released on May 22, 2012 continues the Commission’s trend toward integrating the single market and increasing its efficacy, but from the perspective of the EU consumer.[i]  A new consumer policy strategy is offered by the Commission based upon four key goals, namely “reinforcing consumer safety; enhancing knowledge; stepping up enforcement and securing redress”[ii] and “aligning consumer rights and policies to changes in society and in the economy.”[iii]  Implementing actions to ensure the attainment of these objectives are also provided.[iv]

The Commission also suggests that achieving the goals of Europe 2020 require the Agenda to attain the promises of the single market.[v]  A broad European ambit is evident in the policy, which seeks to eliminate barriers to free movement, to enhance consumer knowledge and choice, and to promote competition.[vi]  Increasing consumer trust in cross-border transactions also appears to be a central aim.[vii]

The advancement of the single market has always played a unique role in the EU’s policy creation.  It has even been argued that economic considerations may at times be relegated to a secondary position with regard to its development and integration.[viii]  The free movement rules, particularly those relating to goods, offer a solid Treaty basis for the Commission’s aims.  An example is Article 34 TFEU, prohibiting “quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect […] between Member States,” its Article 35 TFEU counterpart relating to exports, and Article 30 TFEU concerning customs duties.  The provisions on the free movement of services such as Article 56 TFEU may also be relevant.  Eliminating barriers for EU consumers involved in cross-border purchasing transactions is essential for ensuring their confidence in the single market.

It may also be argued that the European Consumer Agenda’s effectiveness lies in its potential to eliminate those measures, which although not restrictive at first glance, would create effects upon trade similar to quantitative restrictions or MEQRs as first described in the seminal Dassonville judgment.[ix]  MEQRs have the potential to represent a significant threat to the purchasing ability of the EU consumer, because they tend to be less evident.

The Commission takes a broad view of the single market in its new Agenda by focusing on the elimination of barriers for both physical as well as digital goods, thereby also reflecting the continued importance of developing a single EU-wide digital marketplace.[x]  The European Commission Statement for Schuman Day by President Barroso[xi] reflects this broad view by advocating greater action with regard to development of the single market and eliminating barriers that may hinder its potential.

The European Consumer Agenda appears to be a further development in advancing the EU single market (broadly defined).  The Commission’s underlying objectives of developing and expanding the internal market by eliminating existing barriers to trade while simultaneously fostering consumer awareness and welfare have been set out in the following four objectives and implementing actions of the European Consumer Agenda:

Four objectives of the European Consumer Agenda

1. “Improving consumer safety” [xii]

The first goal of the new EU Consumer Agenda is the improvement of consumer safety by enhancing the product and service safety supervisory framework, developing the framework for market observation and enhancing safety with regard to food products.[xiii]  Consumer safety in the single marketplace requires a system of unified controls in order to be effective.  Consistent rules based upon established expectations of safety are necessary if confidence in cross-border purchasing is to be achieved.

The Commission acknowledges the increased use of services by consumers between Member States is creating a need to address safety through regulations at the national or EU level.[xiv]  In response, a plan is put forth to revise and enhance the existing product safety legislative framework in order to promote consumer protection.[xv]  Creating modern, enhanced, and consistent market surveillance rules will lead to greater participation and cooperation between the authorities of varying Member States and increased consumer safety.[xvi]

2. “Enhancing knowledge” [xvii]

The second goal of the EU Consumer Agenda is improving the degree and availability of knowledge by increasing awareness for both consumers and merchants of consumer rights and interests while enhancing consumer market participation.[xviii]  Providing consumers with greater knowledge of their rights at EU level may encourage greater confidence in cross border purchasing transactions and subsequently lead to increased commerce.  A lack of awareness on the part of consumers, when purchasing in markets other than those with which he or she is already familiar, may act as an impediment to commerce and cross-border transactions.  Such barriers may be eliminated through informed consumers who are in possession of consistent consumer rights that are available to them throughout the internal market.  Enhancing knowledge will not only enable consumers and merchants to possess a greater awareness of their rights and responsibilities, but will also increase trust and the accessibility of finding solutions for difficulties arising during a transaction.[xix]  The European Consumer Centres’ Network embodies the idea of fostering and developing consumer knowledge at EU level.[xx]  Strengthening the Network will enable more effective dissemination of the rights to which consumers are entitled when purchasing across borders and act as an aid and resource for any disputes which may arise.[xxi]  Increasing consumer knowledge may have the ability to eliminate barriers to cross-border transactions and stimulate greater commerce within the internal market.

3. “Improving implementation, stepping up enforcement and securing redress” [xxii]

The third goal of the EU Consumer Agenda is enhancing methods of redress, implementation, and enforcement in order to provide consumers with more effective methods of dispute resolution.[xxiii]  Effective methods of redress must be provided at EU level in order to encourage consumer confidence and safety, particularly with regard to faulty products, and regardless of where the transaction took place within the internal market.  The European Small Claims Procedure will offer increased accessibility and create enhanced value for EU consumers involved in transactions between Member States up to the value of EUR 2000 by reducing litigation expenses and expediting claims.[xxiv]  Prohibitive costs and cross-jurisdictional difficulties are subsequently mitigated by this procedure.  EU consumers will be better informed and perhaps more inclined to defend their rights, because of the availability of an effective method of EU-wide redress for their consumer transactions.

4. “Aligning rights and key policies to economic and societal change”[xxv]

The fourth goal of the EU Consumer Agenda is adapting consumer policies and rights to economical and societal changes with particular regard to the concerns of the digital market and sustainability.[xxvi]  Consumers must have confidence in physical and digital purchases regardless of their point of purchase within the EU.  Promotion of an integrated market for consumers is evidenced in the Agenda by its emphasis on eliminating barriers which may prevent digital products and services from being effectively accessed by consumers within the single market.[xxvii] Additionally, the Common European Sales Law and the Data Protection Reform Package are proposals that will hopefully aid in achieving the aim of eliminating barriers and creating effective access to one’s digital and physical products and services throughout the EU.[xxviii]

The proposed “Online Dispute Resolution” process would also aid in eliminating barriers and provide a method of redress at EU level for consumers.[xxix]  Eliminating obstacles for digital purchases and providing an effective EU-wide means of redress for digital consumers may enhance consumer confidence in cross border transactions and promote the growth of the single market for both physical and digital goods.

Implementing actions

The Commission also provides specific implementing actions that reflect a concern with eliminating obstacles to the free movement of goods for consumers.  Implementing actions set out by the Commission involve measures for the resolution of digital consumer difficulties; financial practices, services and products; food labeling, health and waste; and matters involving efficient energy usage and related technology as well as the development of increased consumer awareness and transparency regarding electric and gas cost consumption.[xxx]  Additional implementing actions will be taken regarding travel packages purchased online, the rights of air and public transport passengers, the fostering of mass transit, and the implementation of steps to aid cleaner fuel usage and awareness.[xxxi]  Measures to increase sustainability and affordability while expanding the quantity of products covered that must meet minimum environmental standards will also be implemented.[xxxii]

One of the most important and challenging steps will be taking action to create a strategy that creates awareness and encourages consumers to make cleaner and more environmentally sustainable fuel choices.[xxxiii]  Additionally, the Commission’s plan for a 2012 legislative initiative to create awareness regarding the fees charged to consumers of retail banks will be challenging, but is essential for facilitating transparency and consumer choice throughout the single market.[xxxiv]

The Commission will also propose potential implementing initiatives, which would determine the necessity of remedies on an EU-wide basis for defective digital products.[xxxv]  EU level solutions intended to increase consumer confidence and welfare within the single market appear to be endorsed.  Additionally, the Commission proposes an implementing measure to update existing rules concerning the rights of airline passengers as of 2013, which would offer protection to travelers who experience cancellations, excessive delays or who are unable to board.[xxxvi]  EU-wide redress for airline passengers would represent a significant step in advancing the single market for consumers.

Conclusion

An emphasis on solutions for consumers at EU level appears to be preferred and advocated by the Commission in its new European Consumer Agenda.  Its proposals and suggested actions for implementation have the aim of eliminating obstructions to the free movement of both physical and digital goods, but with a focus on the consumer, in an effort to further develop the single market.  It remains to be seen between now and 2014 how effective these measures will be for the EU consumer.

 

[i] Commission Press Release of 22 May 2012, A New European Consumer Agenda – Boosting Confidence and Growth by Putting Consumers at the Heart of the Single Market, IP/12/491, p. 1. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/491> Accessed 16th of June 2012.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] See Commission Communication of 22 May 2012, A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting Confidence and Growth COM (2012) 225, p. 2. <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer_agenda_2012_en.pdf> Accessed 16th of June 2012.

[vi] Commission Communication, A European Consumer Agenda, p. 2.

[vii] Commission Press Release of 22 May 2012, A New European Consumer Agenda – Boosting Confidence and Growth by Putting Consumers at the Heart of the Single Market, IP/12/491, p. 1.

[viii] Monti, G. EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007), p. 41.

[ix] Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, p. 852.

[x] Commission Communication, A European Consumer Agenda, p. 12.

[xi] Statement by President Barroso: “Seizing the Moment to Boost Growth: 9th May Message from the European Commission” Joint press conference with Vice-President Rehn Brussels, 8 May 2012, p. 2. < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/337> Accessed 16th of June 2012.

[xii] Commission Communication, A European Consumer Agenda, p. 8.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Ibid., 8-9.

[xvii] Ibid., p. 9.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Ibid., 9-10.

[xx] Ibid., p. 10.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Ibid., p. 10.

[xxiv] Ibid., p. 12.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid., p. 13.

[xxvii] Ibid., p. 12.

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix] Ibid., 12-13.

[xxx]  Ibid., 13-15.

[xxxi] Ibid., p. 15.

[xxxii] Ibid., p. 16.

[xxxiii] Ibid., p. 15.

[xxxiv] Ibid., p. 14.

[xxxv] Ibid., p. 13.

[xxxvi] Ibid., p. 15.