Ankit Sharma, Himanshu Pabreja
The prohibition on the grant of financial assistance by a company to any person for the purpose of purchasing or acquiring the company’s own shares is typical of common law jurisdictions. The practice was originally introduced in the United Kingdom after the Greene Committee expressed its disaffection with the practice of ‘asset stripping’ takeovers, whereby the resources of the target company and its subsidiaries are used directly or indirectly to assist the purchaser financially to make the acquisition. Indeed, as the target company remains to be an empty shell, the practice is seen as liable to prejudicing the interests of the creditors of the target company, or of any shareholders who do not accept the offer for their shares to be acquired, or the existing shareholders of the company who are not extended an offer for purchase of their shares by such purchaser. Continue reading
Isabelle Wenger, LL.M. in International Dispute Resolution at King’s College London
‘The dispute settlement system negotiated during the Uruguay Round seems to me still today an extraordinary achievement that comes close to a miracle. It seems to me to be wise not to take its existence for granted and to be guaranteed forever but to contribute to its consolidation and further developing in pursuing with circumspection and caution, but also with courage and in total independence, the road, which has been taken, and which has proved so far to be a notable success.’
Neta Nadiv, Lecturer and Academic Director of Legal Clinics at Harry Radzyner Law School, Inter Disciplinary Center, Herzlia
Despite its importance and deep repercussions for society, Personal Insolvency rules (PI) receive little attention compared to corporate bankruptcy. Consequently, many fundamental questions regarding the purpose and likely impact of PI rules remain largely unaddressed.
In the following lines, I will discuss the little known – yet practically very important – recent shift of approach in the application of PI rules towards “corporate” responsibility, under which Courts tend to recognize special obligations binding corporate actors in PI proceedings.
To this aim, I will review some recent Israeli courts’ rulings – particularly the District Court’s case in Shams. This case is of defining importance in understanding the repercussions of the “corporate responsibility approach” in that the court adopts a broad outcome-based understanding of insolvency and rethinks the idea of equality of creditors. Continue reading
Nidhi Singh. Economics for Competition Law student at King’s College London – Practising Advocate with the Supreme Court of India
Competition law and Intellectual Property law may at first appear to have different scope. However, the increasing number of cases involving Competition law and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) matters proves otherwise. Specifically, the case-law of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) illustrates that the scope of these two disciplines may at times overlap and their aims collide.
In the following lines, I will discuss whether, and to what extent, a conflict may arise between Competition law and IPR. To this aim, I will sketch the Indian Competition law provisions regulating the exercise of IPR. Reference will then be made to Indian case-law regarding the jurisdictional issues arising from the overlap between Competition law and IPR. I will conclude by arguing that Competition law and IPR are not so irreconcilable as it may appear at first, and some balance can – and needs to – be found between these two disciplines.