{"id":285,"date":"2012-04-16T07:59:06","date_gmt":"2012-04-16T07:59:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.kslr.org.uk\/blogs\/humanrights\/?p=285"},"modified":"2022-06-08T12:00:38","modified_gmt":"2022-06-08T12:00:38","slug":"should-the-prohibition-against-torture-give-way-in-the-present-atmosphere-of-adjusting-the-balance-between-liberty-and-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/2012\/04\/16\/should-the-prohibition-against-torture-give-way-in-the-present-atmosphere-of-adjusting-the-balance-between-liberty-and-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Should the prohibition against torture \u2018give way\u2019 in the present atmosphere of adjusting the balance between liberty and security?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

This article will examine the moral dilemma surrounding the use of torture, and particularly, whether torture is ever justified in the face of a resounding threat to national security.\u00a0 This is a morally questionable task to take on; Slavoj Zizek has argued that \u201cessays \u2026 [that] simply introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate are even more dangerous than an explicit endorsement of torture\u201d,[1]<\/a> because they legitimise the discourse and thereby change the normative framework.\u00a0 This author believes, however, that it is necessary to deal with these difficult questions in order to push against the growing trend of civil liberties retractions by Western liberal democratic governments from their citizens.<\/p>\n

This article will attempt to negate the above statement in three sections.\u00a0 Firstly, it will establish the tenor of the \u2018present atmosphere\u2019 by assessing the impact of the September 11 attacks on the absolute prohibition on torture in international law. \u00a0It will then attempt to undermine the above statement through a critical examination of the idea of a \u2018balance\u2019 between liberty and security.\u00a0 Finally, having established the fallacy of the \u2018balance\u2019 concept, it will assert that torture should not \u2018give way\u2019, even in the face of security threats.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Torture: status and threats<\/strong><\/p>\n

The non-derogable right to not be subjected to torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,[2]<\/a> finds its place in six international human rights conventions as well as the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit its use in situations of armed conflict. Henry Shue wrote in 1978, \u201cno other practice except slavery is so universally and unanimously condemned in law and human convention,\u201d[3]<\/a> and the Human Rights Committee in 1992 proclaimed, \u201cno justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of this right.\u201d[4]<\/a> \u00a0This tight web of international treaty law, customary international law, soft law declarations, and academic scholarship, led the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundzija<\/em> in 1998 to label the prohibition on torture a jus cogens<\/em> norm.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

Following the September 11 attacks in the US and the subsequent establishment of a global \u2018security\u2019 paradigm, however, torture\u2019s jus cogens<\/em> status came under threat, as did a number of other supposed non-derogable human rights. \u00a0George Bush\u2019s 2001 US Patriot Act ushered in a new era of executive and expanded police powers that sanctioned, inter alia<\/em>, incommunicado detention, prolonged detention without charge, denial of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention,[6]<\/a> illegal deportation, and ill-treatment of detainees.[7]<\/a> \u00a0UN SC Resolution 1373 (2001) internationalised this new counter-terrorism paradigm, calling for State compliance to counter-terrorism measures and establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee under its Chapter VII powers.[8]<\/a>\u00a0 Many have argued that States have used this Resolution to justify encroachments upon civil liberties using anti-terrorism discourse.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

Indeed, the ensuing decade has seen a series of increasing infringements on civil liberties, including an arbitrary UN-sanctioned \u2018blacklist\u2019,[10]<\/a> the horrors of Abu Ghraib in 2004, the withdrawal of habeas corpus<\/em> for Guantanamo Bay detainees,[11]<\/a> the express permission of statements obtained by coercive interrogation as evidence before military commissions,[12]<\/a> and the Jay Bybee torture memos which attempted to define torture out of existence.[13]<\/a>\u00a0 Apart from intermittent but spirited backlash from human rights courts,[14]<\/a> a decade on from 9\/11, we have not seen a return to \u2018normal\u2019, but instead, a process of institutionalisation of these emergency controls, resulting in a shift in the normative framework described by Giorgio Agamben as a legitimised \u2018state of exception\u2019.[15]<\/a>\u00a0 It can be concluded that torture, while still prohibited on paper, is tolerated in practice.<\/p>\n

The \u2018balance\u2019 myth<\/strong><\/p>\n

This section will examine whether the \u2018balance\u2019 argument, which is often employed to justify the mitigation of human rights, in fact carries any weight.\u00a0 Jeremy Waldron defines the idea of a \u2018balance\u2019 between security and liberty as \u201cthe maximum risk we are prepared to bear as a result of people\u2019s liberty\u201d.[16]<\/a> \u00a0In his 2003 paper he challenges this idea of a \u2018balance\u2019, arguing persuasively that abrogating citizens\u2019 civil rights, including the prohibition on torture, is not a plausible means of avoiding catastrophic horror.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n

Waldron challenges the consequentialist claim that when added weight is given to the security argument without a corresponding addition to the human rights argument, the balance must logically shift in its favour. \u00a0He argues that instead, rights are trumps, impervious to balance, and even if they were not, abrogating human rights has not been proved to be a plausible means of dealing with an enhanced security situation.[18]<\/a>\u00a0 Indeed, towards the end of his paper, Waldron highlights that empirical evidence does not show that abrogation of civil liberties effectively counters security threats.<\/p>\n

Waldron also discusses the issue of \u201cequality not equilibrium\u201d;[19]<\/a> the idea that restricting civil liberties affects some parts of society more than others, and while most people will \u2018pay\u2019 nothing for their increase in security, some will suffer disproportionately.[20]<\/a>\u00a0 As Ronald Dworkin puts it, these \u201cfamiliar metaphors of \u2018trade-off\u2019 and \u2018balance\u2019 are deeply misleading\u201d, as they hide the realities of the compromise.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n

Waldron helps us understand that the notion of a \u2018balance\u2019 between security and liberty is false, and that a prohibition on torture could never be weighed directly against national security ends in a zero-sum fashion.<\/p>\n

Torture as an absolute ethical proscription<\/strong><\/p>\n

This section will challenge the permissibility of torture on security grounds from a moral and ethical perspective.\u00a0 Even if security could justify torture, is it ever permissible? This argument typically contemplates the use of torture in the hypothetical \u2018ticking bomb\u2019 scenario.\u00a0 Judge Posner has stated that only the strictest civil libertarian would reject torture if the stakes were high enough,[22]<\/a> and the Israeli Supreme Court agreed with Posner in its 2005 judgment, trustingly leaving the decision up to Israeli security service investigators.[23]<\/a> \u00a0A real-life \u2018ticking bomb\u2019 situation was contemplated in Germany in 2010, and indeed the court seemed hesitant to punish the torturers harshly for their seemingly morally justified actions.[24]<\/a> \u00a0Alan Dershowitz, notorious for his 2002 article advocating torture warrants,[25]<\/a> has called an absolute prohibition on torture \u201cna\u00efve \u2026 hypocritical and ultimately illiberal\u201d.[26]<\/a><\/p>\n

However, this hypothetical does not account for the extreme nature of the situation, and the rarity in which it will be encountered.\u00a0 As Neil Belton stated, the \u2018ticking bomb\u2019 scenario \u2013 whether conducted surreptitiously or \u201csubject to some kind of juridical oversight\u201d[27]<\/a> \u2013 is just a fantasy that is used by those who wish to justify torture.[28]<\/a>\u00a0 Others take a more pragmatic approach to the negation of the utilitarian \u2018ticking bomb\u2019 scenario, arguing that information obtained through torture will be false, unreliable, and that a person would say anything to relieve the torture.[29]<\/a>\u00a0 Far from protecting national security, this information may serve to harm it.<\/p>\n

Another, sociological, argument for never condoning torture was expounded by Emile Durkheim in 1898, who argued that torture \u201ceternally corrodes and corrupts us\u201d,[30]<\/a> and is a crime so heinous that when employed, it destroys society\u2019s moral existence.[31]<\/a><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

This essay has established that the legal prohibition on torture is a jus cogens<\/em> norm under threat from a security paradigm, currently operating in Western liberal democracies, that aims to curtail civil liberties.\u00a0 This essay has shown that this insidious and pervasive discourse preys on the idea of a \u2018balance\u2019 between liberty and security, but that in fact this balance does not exist.\u00a0 Even if it did, far from accepting the use of torture to protect our national security, the legal prohibition on torture should be maintained on moral and ethical grounds, lest the foundations of our society be rent asunder.<\/p>\n

Julian Elderfield<\/strong><\/p>\n

London School of Economics<\/p>\n

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[1]<\/a> S. Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real <\/em>(London: Verso, 2002), pp. 103\u20134.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[2]<\/a> See HRC General Comment No.5: Derogation of rights (Art. 4):\u00a007\/31\/1981; Ireland v UK<\/em> ECHR 1978 2 EHRR 25; Aksoy v Turkey<\/em> [1996] ECHR 68.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[3]<\/a> H. Shue, \u2018Torture\u2019 7 Philosophy & Public Affairs<\/em> 2 (1978), p124.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[4]<\/a> HRC General Comment No.20: (Art. 7): 03\/10\/1992.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[5]<\/a> Prosecutor v Furundzija<\/em> IT-95-17\/1-T, (10 December 1998), 153.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[6]<\/a> Until the US Supreme court in Rasul v. Bush<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>542 U.S. 466\u00a0(2004) ruled that federal courts have jurisdiction over detention of Guantanamo detainees.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[7]<\/a> S. Marks & A. Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon<\/em> (Oxford: OUP, 2005), pp347-8.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[8]<\/a> S\/RES\/1373 (2001).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[9]<\/a> Human Rights Watch, \u2018Opportunism in the face of tragedy: Repression it the name of anti-terrorism\u2019 <http:\/\/www.hrw.org\/legacy\/campaigns\/september11\/opportunismwatch.htm<\/a>> accessed 04.03.2012.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[10]<\/a> Challenged in Bosphorus v Ireland<\/em> (Application. No. 45036\/98) & Kadi v<\/em>\u00a0Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities<\/em>\u00a0(ECJ, September 3, 2008).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[11]<\/a> Graham-Levin amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[12]<\/a> Military Commissions Act of 2006.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[13]<\/a> See J. Bybee, \u2018Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2340-2340A\u2019, (1 August 2002), p19.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[14]<\/a> See Hamdan v Rumsfield<\/em> 548 U.S. 557 (2006): Al-Jedda v UK <\/em>(Application No. 27021\/08); Al-Skeini v UK <\/em>(Application No. 55721\/07); Abu Qatada v UK<\/em> (Application No. 8139\/09).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[15]<\/a> G. Agamben, State of Exception<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[16]<\/a> J. Waldron, \u2018Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance\u2019 11 The Journal of Political Philosophy <\/em>2 (2003) p193-4.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[17]<\/a> ibid<\/em>, p198.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[18]<\/a> ibid<\/em>, pp195-200.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[19]<\/a> Marks, above n10, p357.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[20]<\/a> Waldron, above n19, pp200-204.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[21]<\/a> R. Dworkin, \u2018The Threat to Patriotism\u2019 New York Review of Books<\/em> (28 Feb 2002), p44, 48.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[22]<\/a> Marks, above n10, p378.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[23]<\/a> Public Committee Against Torture et al. v. Israel<\/em>, (HCJ 769\/02), 2006, 40.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[24]<\/a> G\u00e4fgen v Germany<\/em> (Application no. 22978\/05).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[25]<\/a> See A. Dershowitz, “Want to torture? Get a warrant,” The San Francisco Chronicle<\/em>\u00a0(January 22, 2002).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[26]<\/a> Marks, above n10, p378.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[27]<\/a> A. Dershowitz, Why terrorism works: understanding the threat, responding to the challenge<\/em> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp133-163.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[28]<\/a>\u00a0 N Belton, The Good Listener<\/em> (London: Phoenix, 1998), p216.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[29]<\/a> Marks, above n10, p381.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[30]<\/a> Taken from Dostoevsky\u2019s The brothers Karamazov<\/em>, see A. Dorfman \u2018Are there times when we have to accept torture?\u2019 The Guardian<\/em> (May 8, 2004).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[31]<\/a> E. Durkheim, \u2018Individualism and the Intellectuals\u2019 (1898), translated by S. and J. Lukes, Political Studies, <\/em>17 (1969), pp. 21\u20132.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction This article will examine the moral dilemma surrounding the use of torture, and particularly, whether torture is ever justified in the face of a resounding threat to national security.\u00a0 This is a morally questionable task to take on; Slavoj Zizek has argued that \u201cessays \u2026 [that] simply introduce it as a legitimate topic of… More Should the prohibition against torture \u2018give way\u2019 in the present atmosphere of adjusting the balance between liberty and security?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":260,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[164],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-285","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-forum-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/285","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/260"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=285"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/285\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2093,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/285\/revisions\/2093"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=285"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=285"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.kcl.ac.uk\/kslr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=285"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}