Rio Branco and the origins of Brazil’s status anxiety

Daniel Buarque
 PhD Candidate at the Joint PhD in International Relations – King’s College London and University of São Paulo.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco

Brazil aspires to a greater active involvement in international relations, to acquire a higher status, and to become recognised as an important player in the global arena. Two separate surveys conducted with the Brazilian foreign policy community show that at least 97% of the respondents favour a more active international role (1). Sources inside the Brazilian government are also unanimous in recognising the importance of the country’s image and prestige abroad (2). Status-seeking has been a dominant and constant factor in Brazil’s foreign policy. All Brazilian governments, since the country became independent in 1822, have shared a key aspiration to seek an influential global role for their country (3). Brazil believes it is entitled to this high-level status based on its perception of the traditional arguments of continental size, natural resources, and economic profile (4). Everything Brazil does in international politics is aligned with the objective of gaining recognition (5).

Ambitions of achieving global importance and international influence are, therefore, not new to Brazilian foreign policy. The drive for prestige as a constitutive element of power lies in the very formation of Brazil and has long been a part of the history of diplomatic relations within the country and is even considered part of the international identity of Brazil (6). Much of this identity comes from the work and legacy of the Baron of Rio Branco, as he inspired the style of diplomatic behaviour that characterizes Brazil (7).

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco, was the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations from 1902 to 1912. When he died, his legacy involved the idea of Brazil as a peaceful nation, with defined national boundaries and a large territory. Diplomat, geographer, historian, monarchist, politician and professor, he has been described as one of the “founding fathers” of Brazilian nationality and of the diplomatic traditions of the country. He was, to a large extent, also responsible for the creation of the idea of Brazil, of the nation, and of the Brazilian nationality departing from a foreign policy perspective (8).

One of the very important pieces of the puzzle of national identity and diplomatic style developed by Rio Branco was this primacy of prestige and status among Brazil’s international agenda priorities. In the early 20th Century, Brazil was still, however, a very provincial nation that had little participation in international issues. This was seen as one of the reasons why Rio Branco worked to professionalise the Brazilian diplomacy and insert Brazil into a global context. The aim, to boost the level of the country’s participation in the international scene (9).

Brazil’s image abroad was a constant concern for the Baron, he wanted to cultivate a strong international image. This was a crucial element in the management of the country’s relations with the Great Powers of Europe. Gaining prestige on Brazil’s behalf was not, consequently, just a matter of vanity and pride, but part of a larger strategy to insert Brazil in the international system of that time (10).

In his very thorough biography of the Baron, Santos (2018) discusses how the importance of Brazil’s international image for the country was well established throughout the life of the Baron. The book also offers numerous examples of how Rio Branco often based his decisions as part of great attempts to project a positive image of Brazil.

In his diplomatic work and efforts to promote Brazil internationally, Rio Branco paid foreign periodicals to try and project a positive image of the country. He offered subsidies to London’s “South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail” as well as Paris’ “Le Brésil”. The Brazilian Chancellor organized an information service to send the international press news from Brazil which could interest the foreign public. This shows that Rio Branco had an early understanding of what would later be known as public diplomacy, helping to modernise the work of Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Ministry). (10)

Rio Branco made the search for international prestige a part of the implementation of Brazilian diplomacy. In one example of this, he instructed the Brazilian jurist, Rui Barbosa, in his work representing Brazil in the Second Peace Conference of Hague in 1907. The main contribution of this partnership was in defence of equality between states and a rejection of a different treatment to nations at the summit based solely on their material power, which the two saw as a discriminatory measure (9). Although the country has appeared to many in the press and international political circles as responsible for the failure of the Hague Conference, Brazil’s performance in the summit did contribute to increasing its international projection (10).

Considering the issue of Brazilian image abroad to be crucial, Rio Branco transformed the Itamaraty Palace in Rio de Janeiro into a mandatory stop for personalities of international expression who passed through Brazil. Due to this, the Baron defended the need to modernise, clean and embellish the national capital. This would lead the city to host international events and visitors and contribute to changing the image of instability that had marked the first years of the Republic and instead promote an image of a modern, stable and urban nation (10).

Another important area viewed by the Baron as significant to increase Brazil’s prestige was his interest in ending slavery. Though it was recognised as a crucial issue in domestic politics, it also had noteworthy effects abroad on the matter of Brazil’s international image. For this reason, Rio Branco argued it was important to publicise the reforms in Europe, showing that it marked the end of slavery in the so-called civilized world. This was a way in which Rio Branco tried to show that Brazil was in fact civilised and to try and leave behind the stain of slavery that was fixed to the image of the country abroad (10).

Although it is not entirely clear as to what caused this preoccupation of the Baron’s regarding the image of his country, Santos’ biography offers an anecdote that can be seen as causing what would later be known in the country, called by Nelson Rodrigues the “complexo de vira-latas”, the mongrel complex: the position of inferiority in which the Brazilian voluntarily puts himself in face of the rest of the world (11) .

While spending time in Paris in his youth before becoming the Baron, the young Paranhos Jr. watched Jacques Offenbach’s operetta “La Vie Parisienne” at the Théâtre du Palais-Royal, which showed a specific depiction of his nationality that would make him uncomfortable with the image of Brazil abroad. One of the characters included in the plot, “the Brazilian”, was a sympathetic nouveau-riche with bad manners and bad taste, as well as being spendthrift, naive and given to ostentation. In his introduction, “the Brazilian” explained that he came from Rio de Janeiro loaded with gold in his luggage and with diamonds on his shirt. In his previous visits to the city, he had stayed long enough to make two hundred friends and win four or five lovers in six months of love intoxication. He had enjoyed life well until Paris took all the money he had brought with him. And yet, “the Brazilian” returned, excited (10).

According to Santos (2018), this caricature reflected the image of Brazil that was being created in certain European circles. This bothered Rio Branco. “The caricature hurt the feeling of identity with the civilization to which Brazilian elites thought they belonged. If the Brazilian monarchy thought of itself as European, there was no reciprocity. The Old Continent saw Brazil in a way that was closer to reality: a backward country, with great natural wealth, run by an elite not very fond of work”, according to Santos (10).

This early contact by the Baron with such a negative depiction of his nation can be interpreted as one of the origins of the “status anxiety” that would permeate Brazil’s relations with the rest of the world for more than a century. This anxiety refers to the idea that one’s self-conception is dependent upon what others think about them. The negative connotation in this external view can lead to a permanent worry of not conforming to ideals of success and the risk of being stripped of dignity and respect as well as an awareness of the need to convince the world of one’s value (12). The impression left in Rio Branco must have been a painful one, and the country’s image abroad would become one of the Baron’s great concerns in the performance of his diplomatic functions and in the head of the Chancellery (10).

References:

(1) Souza, A. de (2002) A Agenda Internacional do Brasil: Um Estudo sobre a Comunidade Brasileira de Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI. — Souza, A. de (2008) Brazil’s International Agenda Revisited: Perceptions of the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community. Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI.

(2) Moura, L. C. (2013) A Marca Brasil: O Poder da Imagem e a Construção da Identidade Competitiva. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco/Ministério das Relações Exteriores. — Nogueira, S. G. & Burity, C. (2014) A construção da imagem do Brasil no exterior e a diplomacia midiática no governo Lula. Revista de Ciências Sociais. (41), 375–397.

(3) Mares, D. R. & Trinkunas, H. A. (2016) Aspirational power: Brazil on the long road to global influence. Geopolitics in the 21st century. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press. — Carvalho, B. de (2020) ‘Brazil’s (Frustrated) Quest for Higher Status’, in Status and the Rise of Brazil. Springer. pp. 19–30. — Carvalho, B. de et al. (2020) ‘Introduction: Brazil’s Humanitarian Engagement and International Status’, in Status and the Rise of Brazil. Springer. pp. 1–15. — Casarões, G. (2020) ‘Leaving the Club Without Slamming the Door: Brazil’s Return to Middle-Power Status’, in Status and the Rise of Brazil. Springer. pp. 89–110. — Stolte, C. (2015) Brazil’s Africa Strategy. [Online]. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. [online]. Available from: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9781137499578 (Accessed 7 February 2018).

(4) Larson, D. W. & Shevchenko, A. (2014) ‘Managing rising powers: The role of status concerns’, in Status in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 33–57. — Hurrell, A. (2006) Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would‐be great powers? International affairs. 82 (1), 1–19. — Fonseca, C. (2017) O Brasil de Lula – A permanente procura de um lugar no sistema internacional. Relações Internacionais. 5551–70.

(5) Burges, S. (2013) Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research. [Online] 19 (2), 286–302.

(6) Lafer, C. (2001) A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira: passado, presente e futuro. Editora Perspectiva. — Ricupero, R. (2017) A diplomacia na construção do Brasil 1750-2016. Rio de Janeiro: Versal.

(7) Lafer, C. (2000) Brazilian international identity and foreign policy: Past, present, and future. Daedalus. 129 (2), 207–238. — Malamud, A. (2011) A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Politics and Society. [Online] 53 (03), 1–24. — Cervo, A. L. & Bueno, C. (2002) História da política exterior do Brasil.

(8) Santos, L. C. V. G. (2018) Juca Paranhos, o Barão do Rio Branco. Editora Companhia das Letras. — Santos, L. C. V. G. (2010) O dia em que adiaram o Carnaval: política externa ea construção do Brasil. Editora UNESP. — Burns, E. B. (1967) Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy. Journal of Inter-American Studies. [Online] 9 (2), 195–212. —Lafer, C. (2009) ‘Brazil and the World’, in Brazil: A Century of Change. Univ of North Carolina Press. pp. 101–120. — Lafer, C. (1990) Reflexões sobre a inserção do Brasil no contexto internacional. Contexto Internacional. 11 (1), 33.

(9) Cardim, C. H. (2007) A Raiz Das Coisas-Rui Barbosa: O Brasil No Mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

(10) Santos, L. C. V. G. (2018) Juca Paranhos, o Barão do Rio Branco. Companhia das Letras

(11) Rodrigues, N. (1993) À sombra das chuteiras imortais. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

(12) De Botton, A. (2008) Status anxiety. Vintage.

The democratising impact of corruption perception: an example from Brazil*

Andreia Reis do Carmo
PhD Candidate at King’s College London and collaborative researcher at the University of Brasília, Brazil.

Carts filled with citizen’s signatures initiating Congress’ appreciation of the Anti-Vote-Buying bill

The literature regarding corruption generally points to its detrimental effect on democracy. The higher the perception of existing corruption, the more citizens distance themselves from politics. Brazil hosted an event in 1999, that showed quite the opposite. Instead, a higher perception of corruption led to greater participation by citizens who signed the petition pressuring Congress to enact the Anti-Vote-Buying Law.

In Brazil, about 6 million people (6% of voters nationally) were offered money for their votes in the 2000 municipal elections (Schaffer, 2007). Vote buying became the “top reason politicians are removed from office: 667 at the municipal level and 31 state and federal politicians” between 2000 and 2008 (Nichter, 2011). These impediments were only possible because of a popular legal initiative led by the Brazilian Catholic Church. This article discusses the Anti-Vote-Buying Law (Lei da Compra de Votos) and analyses it using process tracing techniques.

The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law of 1999, one of the fastest laws ever to be approved in the country, is an example of how perceived corruption fuelled public engagement. This, in turn, was essential for this specific electoral accountability matter. The author analyses the process identifying two sets of factors ranked according to their causal power (distal and proximal conditions) and rule out alternative hypotheses using process tracing tests.

Important to background of this story, and considered distal conditions, is the National Constituent Assembly, the 1988 Constitution and popular initiatives (a direct participatory mechanism). Key actors were able to gain experience and knowledge in combating corruption, triggering political participation and designing laws during this Assembly. Internationally, the scenario was an incentive for the mitigation of corruption. The Inter-American Corruption Convention, took place in 1996, organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) and a year later, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) held the Anti-Bribery Convention.

Corruption scandals covered by the Brazilian media rose in number from 1987 to 1999. Since the return to democracy in 1985, the establishment of the 1988 constitution, and the direct elections of 1989, Brazil has been plagued by corruption scandals. During President Sarney’s government (1985 to 1990) there were three corruption scandals; during president Collor’s and Itamar Franco’s mandate (1990-1995), five; in Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s first government (1995-1998), eight; and his second mandate (1999-2003) saw six corruption scandals. I have called this a rise in uninformed corruption perception because it was, not yet, accompanied by information on accountability.

Closer in time of the creation of the law, the Brazilian population, who perceived corruption at a high level, learned about the antidemocratic aspects of vote buying and how to curb it. This informed perception of corruption led people to politically participate by signing the popular initiative pushing legislative changes into Congress. The informed corruption perception was enabled by a national campaign chaired by the Catholic Church, who claimed “a vote does not have a price, it has consequences”. Brazilians now knew selling their votes was one way to enable crooked politicians into power.

The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law is a case that shows how corruption perception impacted positively on political participation. The article analysis the specific critical juncture, of which information formed a part. Two consecutive types of perceived corruption— uninformed and informed—stimulated people to sign the popular initiative. Brazil in this period (1987-1999) is one more example of the mobilizing power of perceived corruption.

These types of corruption perception in certain moments in time can stimulate participation among the mass population. Aside from the nature of the corruption perception, not all types of participation will be affected. The popular initiative was a low-cost form of mobilization facilitated by the social movement. Moreover, not all forms of information are able to elevate corruption perception into mobilization. Information about how corrupt a country is might push citizens away from politics, but it is still necessary to make the issue salient. After corruption became a relevant issue in this case, accountability information drove people to voice their complaints.

The mobilizing power of corruption perception was seen in the signing of the popular initiative. The paper argues that the mobilizing corruption perception was triggered by the spread of information on corruption scandals, culminating in accountability social pressure. Low-cost participation and accountability information were important variables in assessing the power of mobilization of corruption perception.

Some level of popular involvement is necessary for particular anticorruption legislative issues to take place, especially those which affect elections. Whenever institutional accountability mechanisms are limited by political will, political participation should be called upon to enact laws.

* This post is a summarized version of a paper published at Südosteuropa- Journal of Politics and Society . For more details and references, see: Reis do Carmo, A., 2018. Turkeys Do Not Vote for Christmas. The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law. Südosteuropa, 66(3), pp.325-348.

The tragedy and the farce of Brazilian Foreign Policy

Alessandra Beber Castilho
PhD Candidate at the Joint PhD in International Relations – King’s College London and University of São Paulo.

President Jair Bolsonaro’s disregard for the media and other actors of the international arena, such as International Organizations (IO) and NGOs, may seem like a major discontinuity of Brazil’s diplomatic tradition. Nonetheless, his stance is strikingly similar to the way in which the military dealt with these international actors during the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985). As the President is a self-confessed admirer of the authoritarian period, and being a former military man himself, this should not come as a surprise.

The Brazilian military and part of the Brazilian civil society saw the 1964 coup d’état that ousted then President João Goulart as a necessary move to save Brazil from Communism, a crucial victory of the West during the Cold War (1). After the coup, Itamaraty (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) took up the task of legitimising the new regime abroad, not as a reactionary authoritarian dictatorship, but as the outcome of a rightful democratic process (2). However, the promulgation of the Institutional Act no. 5 in 1968 brought a challenge to its legitimisation. In the wake of the events that transpired in the Western world in the late 1960s, the world began to pay attention to human rights violations committed by US allies. Solidarity movements towards Brazilian people gained strength, and many Brazilian exiles started talking (3). In 1970, Amnesty International released a report about torture in Brazil, which drew great attention to the human rights violations that were being committed in the country.

For the Brazilian military regime, however, the criticism of some actors, such as media outlets and Human Rights organizations was part of a plot designed by what they called the International Communist Movement. Allegedly, the plot was a defamatory device aimed at tarnishing Brazil’s image abroad since the country had imposed a major defeat to the communist world in 1964. Notwithstanding, the country was able to dismiss accusations regarding human rights violations, especially torture and forced disappearance in fora such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (4). The human rights issue was not a problem for US-Brazil relations during the government of Brazilian military President Emilio G. Medici (1969-1974). It was also, indeed, overlooked by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who saw Brazil as an important ally of the Nixon Doctrine (5).

The United States’ position would change with the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. Carter was responsible for one of the major shifts in US Foreign Policy. This new foreign policy was vocal about human rights violations by traditional US allies, Brazil included – something that caused great discomfort between military President Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and Carter himself. The Brazilian military perceived this shift as a betrayal since the regime that emerged after the 1964 coup was only possible with the help of the United States (6).

Unlike the military in 1964, President Jair Bolsonaro was democratically elected in October 2018. However, it is interesting to trace the parallels between his foreign policy approaches and those of the military regime. Notwithstanding the blatant authoritarianism, the passionate defense of the military dictatorship and the fact that Bolsonaro himself is a former member of the Brazilian army, it is noteworthy to see a repetition of conspiracy theorists’ Cold War rhetoric, this time mixed with new alt-right elements.

Ernesto Araújo, Bolsonaro’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, gained notoriety after publishing an article called Trump e o Ocidente (Trump and the West) in 2017. In this article, he defends the position that Trump’s election in 2016 was the ultimate victory of the West, the one thing that could prevent its demise. According to Araújo, Western civilization is under the threat of dangerous forces that, in the past, were known as Communism – nowadays these forces go under the name of globalism (7). Bolsonaro, in his inauguration speech in the 2019 UN General Assembly, much like the military in 1964, claimed that he had saved the country from the perils of Socialism (8).

As the Human Rights issue drew the attention of the international public opinion during the military dictatorship, now we face criticism because of the way the Brazilian government has been dealing with the environment, especially the Amazon fires in 2019 as well as more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. In his speech at the inauguration of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Bolsonaro has claimed that the country has been a victim of a massive disinformation campaign led by the media and international organizations, such as the ways in which the fires that afflicted the Amazon forest and the Pantanal region are discussed. Furthermore, he reaffirmed his unconditional allegiance towards US President Donald Trump. In this sense, regarding US-Brazilian relations, he has established a more radical form of Americanist foreign policy, something we can call Trumpism. Just like the military regime under President Médici found support amongst those in the Nixon administration, Bolsonaro has in Trump an important ally in the international arena. However, things will certainly change when President-elect Joe Biden takes office in the United States. Much like Geisel and Carter, we can expect a weakening of US-Brazilian relations, and the country will face harsher criticism abroad.

References:

(1) Green, James N. We Cannot Remain Silent – opposition to the Brazilian military dictatorship in the United States. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

(2) Airgram, Embassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State, 23.04.1964. Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Brazil. Political & Defense. Box 1932. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State. NARA – College Park, MD.

(3) Green, 2010

(4) Bernardi, Bruno Boti. Silence, hindrances and omissions: the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and the Brazilian military dictatorship. The International Journal of Human Rights, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1299915

(5) Spektor, Matias. Kissinger e o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2009.

(6) Reis, Daniel Arao. Ditadura e democracia no Brasil: Do golpe de 1964 à Constituição de 1988. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2014.

(7) Araújo, Ernesto. Trump e o Ocidente. Cadernos de Política Exterior. Ano III, número 6, 2017. http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/CADERNOS-DO-IPRI-N-6.pdf

(8) Leia a íntegra do discurso de Bolsonaro na ONU. Folha de São Paulo, 24.09.2019 https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/09/22/leia-a-integra-do-discurso-de-bolsonaro-na-assembleia-geral-da-onu.htm

National security neglect and the defence sector in Brazil

Raphael C. Lima, PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London

Peterson F. Silva, Professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, Ministry of Defence)

Gunther Rudzit, Associate Professor of International Relations at ESPM and Professor at the Brazilian Air Force University (UNIFA)

Brazilian army deployment to guarantee law and order – GLO operation. (Photo: Brazilian Army)

Making sense of the security apparatus in contemporary Brazil is a complex issue. Nowadays, people may find snapshots of Brazilian security agencies’ actions through the news. Examples are varied: armed bank robbers violently storming small Brazilian cities; civilians killed by ‘stray bullets’; Brazilian Armed Forces fighting environmental crimes in the Amazon region; Brazilian institutions hit by cyberattacks; the Federal Police’s constant operations against money laundry and political corruption; Armed Forces repressing border crimes; militias expanding control in Rio de Janeiro; and police officers killing and being killed on Brazilian streets. But why do we need to analyse and understand roles, missions and coordination between different security agencies?

Organising security forces is a necessary challenge for contemporary democracies. After all, a failure to define specific roles to security forces and not providing them with effective resources and limits can lead to grave social problems, human rights violations, inefficient use of resources, and ineffective use of force. This is especially important in the contemporary world. The nature of security threats has gone beyond traditional state-to-states and demands larger cooperation and integration among military branches, police forces, gendarmery forces, and intelligence services. Providing political direction and management of these issues is what the literature calls national security policymaking. That is, ‘the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s strategic goals’ (Chuter 2011, p.13).

This national security policymaking activity coordinates and gives a larger common direction to three main axes of a state’s national security policy: intelligence, defence, and public safety (Figure 1). This is a process of policy engineering that can be comprised of two main elements. First, national security documents—a National Security Policy or Strategy (e.g., France, U.S., Spain and UK strategies)—capable of providing general guidelines for the whole security apparatus. However, only having a strategy is not enough. There must also be effective national security institutions who are responsible for putting together strategies and directions for the whole security sector (e.g., the U.S. and the UK National Security Councils, and France Stratégie). That is, cross-sector permanent organisations with permanent specialised civilian personnel that can coordinate and provide major guidelines. Once these are put in place, then, this larger policy instructs the three main axes of a national security policy, defence, intelligence, and public safety.

Understanding this complex mosaic of security agencies and missions may seem complex in a Brazilian contemporary environment. Especially in a domestic security environment with high levels of social violence—violent death rate of 27.5 per 100,000, rising paramilitary groups in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and organised criminal organisations, such as the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital—PCC) and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho—CV), going global and operating in Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru. Nowadays, these issues have become more complicated by the Venezuelan crisis that has spurred global geopolitical competition between the U.S., China, and Russia in Brazil’s vicinity. South America is no longer a region distant from great power politics and thus military diplomacy and capabilities become important resources.

However, Brazil lacks a clear and structured national security strategy or clear cross-sector definitions. Quite the opposite, one may see more and more military officers acting in defence and intelligence leadership positions without the presence of institutionalised civilian roles; a military expenditure characterized by approximately 79% assigned to Personnel costs and 13% to Equipment in 2019; bureaucratic struggles between military service branches; fragile controls and oversight mechanisms in defence, intelligence, and public safety; and growing examples of Armed Forces deployed in public safety.

Not having effective national security policymaking may have negative effects on security policies. In the case of post-authoritarian states, traditional problems of civil-military relations—such a democratic controls over the armed forces, civilianisation of the defence sector, creating effective political directions, engaging society and the parliament in security and defence topics—might be worsened when internal security threats rise. This seems to be the case of Brazil. What is the effect of not having civilianised and effective national security policymaking to the defence sector in the country? What is the relationship between fragile coordination among security agencies, weak democratic controls, and the growing military engagement in public safety? Our recent article published in the journal Defence Studies aimed to address this question.

We argued that, since democratisation in 1985, civilian elites have neglected national security policymaking and the military has since maintained several military prerogatives. Instead, as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to deal with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking. The military, in turn, resisted defence reforms that challenged their prerogatives. Additionally, political elites delegated civilian posts to the Armed Forces in defence, public safety and intelligence, instead of engaging in broader reforms.

Our study shows that this led to a vicious cycle of military dependency, which deteriorated the already fragile political controls over the Armed Forces, inhibited defence reforms, and increased the military role in the state and society. This ultimately led to the resurgence of the military in the political arena. To reach this conclusion, we analysed the three axes of a national security policy—intelligence, public safety, and defence.

We noted that Brazil has had an un-concluded national security policymaking process. The larger cross-national coordination process at the Federal level has never come to fruition and did not move beyond specific ad hoc efforts, such as the Strategic Border Plans, and the security coordination during the international events held in the country. Regarding the Intelligence sector, Brazil did build a civilian agency, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), in 1999. Yet, ABIN has been subject to military gatekeeping since it is directly subordinate to the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI/PR), a Ministry-level organisation led by Army Generals since 1985 and that does not have to be approved by Senate hearings. The public safety area has also contributed to this in process. In general, Brazilian police forces have a low law enforcement capacity and are very fragmented. Corruption, lack of basic supplies and equipment for policing activities, low effectiveness, and police strikes are very common problems.

Instead of broader reforms and coordination, civilians aimed to solve these crises by slowly pushing the military to deal with internal security problems. From border crime repression to temporary domestic deployments to guarantee law and order (GLO operations)—that grew in time and scope over time (table 1)—, the Armed Forces have been expanding their involvement in internal affairs. These new missions and domestic military deployments have affected the results of defence reforms. In general, civilians did not engage on broad reforms that tacked military prerogatives and most reforms put forward were those that favoured previous military agendas. As a result, the military maintained large political spaces for the armed forces within defence policymaking such as publishing the new defence strategies, defining budget priorities, occupying key ministerial posts etc. A key example is that the position of Minister of Defence has been occupied by Retired Army Generals since 2016.

Over time, the combination of expanded roles in public safety and ineffective reforms inhibited defence reforms that have challenged military prerogatives—e.g., civilian careers in the Ministry of Defence or reducing the powers of the Military Commanders. As we argue, there is no power vacuum. As civilians neglected national security policymaking and delegated more and more posts to military officers in public safety and defence, the military expanded their role in these areas and occupied spaces. This ultimately led to the weakening of the already fragile democratic controls (table 2).

This, of course, is not a process set in stone and can be overcome. We consider that Brazilian civilian elites can move beyond this national security neglect and engage on proper national security policymaking. A few important first steps would be (1) to publish an effective national security strategy; (2) to create civilianised and institutionalised national security council/committee capable of providing political direction to security policies and coordinating cross-sectorial efforts; and (3) to create permanent civilian positions to the Minister of Defence and aim to improve military effectiveness; (4) to increase democratic controls of the defence sector, engaging parliament and other government agencies. Together these can be important initial steps to make sense of the security apparatus and start organising roles and missions between different security agencies.

References:

Chuter, D. 2011. Governing & Managing the Defence Sector. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Tribunal de Contas da União. 2020. Memorando N. 57/2020-Segecex. Brasília: Tribunal de Contas da União.

More details:

No power vacuum: national security neglect and the defence sector in Brazil
Defence Studies
Raphael C. Lima , Peterson F. Silva & Gunther Rudzit (2020)
DOI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2020.1848425

The image of Brazil as a country on the fence

Daniel Buarque
Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at the KBI

Former US President Barack Obama and his family tour the Christ the Redeemer statue in 2011. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

While the international image of Brazil is traditionally associated with popular stereotypes such as football and beaches (Buarque, 2019), the country’s methods of diplomacy provoke a different perception abroad. Although Brazilian diplomats are praised for their competence, Brazil is still usually seen by the rest of the world as a country that remains “on the fence” and avoids taking sides in international disputes.

This view, regarding Brazil, was the focus of a recent paper published by Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RPBI). Focusing on the perceptions held by British diplomats, the study developed argued that the British diplomats perceive Brazil as a country that seems to want to be “friends with everyone” and, thus, avoids taking sides on any international disputes. It remains “on the fence” in important issues, which in turn may hinder the legitimacy of its bid for a stronger voice in global politics. These arguments were developed during the research that I conducted during my Ph.D. as a student on the Joint International Relations programme at King’s College London and the University of São Paulo.

The paper ‘A country on the fence: the United Kingdom’s perceptions on the status and international agenda of Brazil’ is based on the analysis of interviews with six British diplomats who served in Brazil and who discuss their perception of the international agenda of the country.

The idea of someone being on the fence is often used to represent indecisiveness. However, in the case of Brazil, the external perception is not that the country is undecided, but that it is unwilling to support one side or another so as to avoid commitment. Offering a position of neutrality is, in fact, just a way of not becoming too involved. It is based on the “unwillingness of Brazil to intervene on one side or the other”, as one of the members of the FCDO interviewed explained (Buarque, 2020).

The image of Brazil as a country unwilling to take sides and remain “on the fence”, however, goes beyond the perception of British diplomats. In his recently released book A Promised Land, former US President Barack Obama uses a similar idea to describe Brazil. According to Obama, the country generally avoided taking sides in international disputes.

The description, which repeats the idea that Brazil remains on the fence, was made while the former president described the decision to launch a military intervention in Libya. Obama made the decision to act whilst he was traveling in Brazil, in March 2011, as part of a “tour designed to boost the United States’ image”. This image had been damaged by the war in Iraq, the war on drugs, and policies such as ones regarding Cuba. According to Obama, this non-involvement attitude of Brazil’s, made his decision even more difficult to make, particularly as he was in the country.

“Under any circumstances, launching a military action while visiting another country posed a problem. The fact that Brazil generally tried to avoid taking sides in international disputes—and had abstained in the Security Council vote on the Libya intervention—only made matters worse.” (Obama, 2020, p661).

According to Sean Burges, Senior Instructor at Carleton University, this avoidance of taking sides is seen as a problem by many who observe the actions of Brazilian diplomacy; ‘Brazilian foreign policymakers want to position their country as a leader, but are almost pathologically averse to explicitly stating this role or accepting the implicit responsibilities’ (Burges, 2017 p.19)

Brazil has this image of being uncommitted to any specific position in international affairs. This makes it appear unwilling to take a side or to want to make any decisions. This action is seen as a problem because Brazil aspires to play a leading role in the world and countries that are actually great powers are states that have to make decisions and take sides. “If you are going to be a world power, being the 5th, 6th largest economy in the world and want the political influence to go with that, you need to be prepared to take sides”, said one of the British diplomats interviewed for the paper mentioned above.

References:

Buarque, D. (2019). Brazil Is Not (Perceived as) a Serious Country: Exposing Gaps between the External Images and the International Ambitions of the Nation. Brasiliana: Journal for Brazilian Studies, 8(1-2), 285-314. https://doi.org/10.25160/bjbs.v8i1-2.112957 

Buarque, D. (2020). A country on the fence: United Kingdom’s perceptions of the status and international agenda of Brazil. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 63(1), e012. Epub September 07, 2020.https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202000112

Burges, S. W. (2017). Brazil in the world: the international relations of a South American giant. Manchester University Press.

Obama, B. (2020). A Promised Land. Crown.