The UK in a Changing Europe

Prof Anand MenonHere at the Policy Institute we host a number of external initiatives that form our Policy Park. The idea is that by creating a diverse ecosystem for policy analysis we can help put forward the most innovative thinking in today’s most important policy issues. The Policy Park is currently made up of the Media Standards Trust, the Ramphal Institute, the Pensions Policy Institute and the ESRC funded The UK in a Changing Europe initiative. In this podcast, Professor Anand Menon, Director of The UK in a Changing Europe (and also European Politics and Foreign Affairs professor at King’s), chats with the project communications officer Ben Miller about the purpose of the initiative and what they hope to achieve through their work. Continue reading

The European Union must have a closer link to national politics if it is to retain its legitimacy

anandmenon

 

Post by Professor Anand Menon. Originally posted on LSE’s European Politics and Policy blog on 19 June 2014.

National governments are still involved in negotiations over nominating a candidate for the next President of the European Commission. Anand Menon writes that while much of this debate has focused on the merits of individual candidates such as Jean-Claude Juncker, the real issue is a structural one concerning the future of the European Parliament. He argues that, whichever candidate is nominated, the European Parliament is no longer fit for purpose as a mechanism for legitimising the EU. Only by forging a stronger link between the Union and politics at the national level can the EU’s democratic legitimacy be ensured.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the European elections. One, however, stands out as the most significant. When it comes to ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, the European Parliament is simply not fit for purpose. At a time when the EU more obviously shapes the economic fortunes of its citizens than ever before, this situation is unsustainable. The future of European integration depends on it being linked more directly to national democratic politics.

This time was meant to be different. Because the European elections were to directly affect the choice of European Commission President, its proponents argued they represented the dawn of a new era of ‘normal,’ partisan EU politics. The European Parliament, as ever, leveraged its powers, nominating candidates for the Commission post in an attempt to foster clear contestation between competing individuals.

Yet nothing changed. As ever, most European voters chose simply not to participate. The vast majority of those who did had no idea about the Presidential candidates their votes were supporting. Many simply chose to use the election to protest against a variety of irritants ranging from mainstream politics to immigration, to the impact of globalisation.

No one has come out of this process well. Not the national governments who, over time, have created this constitutional mess with their willingness to increase the powers of a parliament neither they nor their voters respect. Nor the EP itself, which has used the elections to attempt a naked power grab spuriously legitimised in the name of ‘democracy’. The much-vaunted (if little watched) televised debates between the Presidential candidates revealed merely how little they disagree on, united as they are by a desire simply to drive integration forward.

Nor has either side distinguished itself following the elections. To argue that Jean-Claude Juncker enjoys a genuine democratic mandate is to wilfully ignore the intentions of the voters. Yet to claim opposition to him is based on an assessment of his credentials is equally disingenuous. The idea, frequently expressed, that Juncker is too much of a backroom dealmaker loses all credibility when the head of the notoriously secretive and profoundly undemocratic IMF is touted as an alternative.

We confront a choice between unpalatable alternatives. Member states could accept Juncker, thus appointing a candidate beholden to the Parliament, and creating political problems for David Cameron. Alternatively, they could select an alternative candidate, sparking an angry confrontation with a Parliament whose approval is needed for the European Commission to take office. In so doing, they would underline their contempt for the (albeit imperfect) mechanisms of representative democracy at the EU level.

The nub of the problem is not about this or that candidate. It is structural. In attempting to enhance its own powers, the EP is acting like parliaments have throughout history. In defending their prerogatives, the member states are acting like normal nation states.

The victim of the clash is the legitimacy of the EU system. Absent a European demos, whose emergence national politicians are understandably reluctant to encourage, the EP is incapable of providing such legitimacy. Absent a means of providing accountability for their collective decisions at the European level, so too are national governments.

For many years, this did not matter. The EU dealt largely with trade and regulation and had no competence over those issues that voters really care about – taxation, welfare, health and education. The Eurozone crisis has changed all this. Decisions taken in Brussels shape the fiscal policy of member states to a degree unimaginable only a few years ago. The EU has, in other words, become politically highly salient.

Consequently, the democratic malaise afflicting European governance is unsustainable. Member states rely on the EU to achieve key policy objectives. A gradual erosion of support for the Union threatens their ability to deliver these. Seeking democratic legitimacy via empowerment of the European Parliament has been repeatedly tried and has failed.

The only alternative is to link the EU more closely with national political processes. This is not to say that these latter are perfect. Far from it. But they do engage citizens in debates over partisan politics to a far greater extent than do European elections. Politicians stand or fall on their records in office, and if those records included active participation in generating EU decisions, these too would be the object of greater democratic scrutiny.

Moreover, direct involvement in EU policy making would change the behaviour of national politicians. As things stand, many of these choose simply to carp from the sidelines, blaming the EU for difficult decisions whilst failing to suggest alternatives. Having a direct say over these decisions would mean putting up or shutting up. The cheap shot at Brussels would no longer be a rational political strategy for national parliamentarians directly involved in the EU legislative process.

Redesigning the system to ensure such involvement will not be easy. There are various competing schemes out there, and ultimately, it will involve treaty change, which many governments are currently desperate to avoid. In the interim, greater use of the yellow card procedure introduced by the Lisbon treaty, and more effective scrutiny of EU legislation through the relevant committees in national parliaments would represent a good start.

The crucial point is that something needs to be done. The two levels of European politics are mutually dependent. Member states need the EU to achieve policy outcomes they could not accomplish alone. The Union depends on these member states in order to function. The methods used to ensure democratic legitimacy must reflect this interdependence, linking national politics directly with the EU and engaging national publics in a way the current system simply fails to do. The alternative is to see the Union lose all legitimacy, undermining its ability to act at the very moment when member states need it most.

Originally posted on LSE’s European Politics and Policy blog on 19 June 2014.

Alain Juppé sets out vision for the future of Europe

By Alice Pannier and Dr Benedict Wilkinson

Alain Juppé, mayor of Bordeaux, former French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke at Kings as part of the Policy Institute at King’s ‘Europe in crisis‘ project on 21 May.

Essentially, M. Juppé sought to send three different messages to three different audiences. To all EU voters, he outlined the main policies of the centre-right European People’s Party in the context of the forthcoming European Parliament elections. To British citizens, he sought to highlight the continuing importance of the EU for the UK (laying particular emphasis on the fact that France still values UK membership). To French electors, he gave a taste of what his European and foreign policy orientations would be if the UMP – for whom he may well yet be a candidate in the 2017 presidential elections – was to return to power.

M. Juppé began by addressing the criticisms directed at the EU, noting that Brussels is often accused of being undemocratic, naïve, inefficient, and the source of widespread unemployment as a result of its policies of austerity. And yet, he pointed out, the current credit crisis originated not in Brussels but in the United States. Moreover,  the EU has proven invaluable in providing member states with a stable currency and low interest rates. The impact of the financial crisis, in other words, would have been far greater had the Union not existed.

The best response to the problems confronting Europe, Juppé argued, is for the EU to move towards greater integration. In particular, EU action is required to enable the Union to be more competitive on the world stage in two areas in particular:  economic policy and energy policy. In the former, Juppé called for common economic policy that would go beyond mere banking supervision, thus agreeing with Angela Merkel’s proposition. His specific proposal foresaw the creation of more regional champions such as Airbus. This has been a traditional French demand, dating from concern about the predatory behaviour of American firms in the 1960s. Yet he gave few details about how such schemes might be promoted, and how governments could be persuaded to support them.

Energy provided the second element of his economic vision. The former minister underlined the strategic necessity for the EU to be less dependent on foreign energy supplies. The EU’s inability to prevent the annexation of Crimea was, according to him, partly down to the Union’s reliance on Russian gas, partly to the inability of Britain, France and Germany’s to speak with one voice on the international stage, partly to considerations of “realpolitik”, such as France’s wish to go ahead with the sale of Mistral ships to Moscow. A possible solution would be for European countries to invest both in nuclear power and renewable energy.

The Q and A session following the speech focused on the Ukrainian crisis, France’s attitude towards on UK membership and the ‘democratic deficit’. On the first, Juppé insisted on the need to restore “a balance” of influence and power between the EU and Russia, for which energy independence is key.

When it came to the position of the UK, Juppe stressed that France remains attached to UK EU membership, arguing that Brexit would be “a catastrophe”. Moreover, he emphasised that there was no need for treaty change, as the current treaties permit an “à la carte” EU, allowing more integration for those who want and can, and opt-outs for others, thus making it unnecessary to either leave the EU, or change the treaties. He gave very little sense, however, of how a Europe in which Eurozone member states proceeded forward with further integration could also take account of non-euro member states such as the UK, whose governments have genuine concerns that tighter Eurozone integration might diminish their influence over key ‘EU-27’ policy areas such as the single market.

On the issue of the ‘democratic deficit’ , the former Prime Minister argued that the Lisbon treaty partly corrected this by giving more power to the Parliament. In light of the results of the elections to the European Parliament, which took place the day after his speech and which saw a significant rise in the popularity of Eurosceptic parties across Europe, however, there is certainly room to doubt whether Europe’s citizens perceive the EU parliament in such a positive light.

The Policy Institute at King’s will discuss the European elections’ results in its next event on 9 June.

Catch up on this event online

Does the EU matter? Part 2

By Louise Borjes

The second EU debate between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage was somewhat of a repetition of the first one, as the leaders yet again clashed over jobs, immigration, and trade. Statistical claims and emotional rhetoric circulated, although the former to a lesser extent as personal attacks played a more central role this time. YouGov snap polls presented Farage as an even clearer winner than in the first debate, obtaining 68% with Clegg only receiving 27% of those asked.

It is clear where these two politicians stand in the question on EU membership – Clegg wants in, Farage wants out. It is less clear what the two biggest parties want. By not participating in this debate, David Cameron and Ed Miliband are visibly taking the backseat in this question. Since the second debate, YouGov has noted average figure of 13% for UKIP, compared to 11% before the debates. Does this point to a fundamental shift in British politics, and has this second debate offered greater clarity to what the implications could be for the 2015 General Election?

The answer to this is reflected by complexity and uncertainty. First of all, surveys have shown that EU membership is not important to many voters for the next General Election. This seems to be one of two possible reasons Labour and the Conservatives decided to take a step back and not focus on this. The second reason could be that they are internally divided, and that this causes them to focus on other issues on which they are unanimous.

The advantage of being unison in this question gives Clegg and Farage the opportunity to link it to other issues already on the agenda for next year’s election, such as the economy and immigration, subsequently adding EU membership to it.

What was even clearer in the second debate than in the first, was that Farage was more successful in doing so than his counterpart. Farage claimed that EU membership has only made it ‘good for the rich: cheaper nannies, cheaper chauffeurs, and cheaper gardeners’, by being able to employ foreign labour as a result of the free movement of people and that the membership has left a ‘white working class effectively as an underclass’. This rather explicit focus on the negative impact on EU membership in other issues could be seen as an attempt to pluck votes from both sides of the bigger Labour/Conservative camp to vote against EU membership and effectively supporting UKIP.

Although it is yet too early to pin down the exact implications, the debates between Clegg and Farage were an attempt to prove that the EU does matter, the latter appearing to be more successful in doing so than the former – given the results of recent polls showing an overall increase of support for UKIP and their opinions.

However, it seems that UKIP’s sophisticated ability in these debates – that is, being politically correct just enough to combine EU membership with other issues without losing face – has proven at least a short-term success. The disadvantage of being internally divided in this question is a weakness the big parties, particularly the Conservatives and David Cameron, most likely will continue to experience. The result of the complexity this combination of political dynamics demonstrates could therefore pose a fundamental shift in British politics. What is possible to conclude, though, is that the EU does matter. To what extent it will affect the political composition in Whitehall is yet to be seen.

Does the EU matter? Part 1

By Louise Borjes and Dr Benedict Wilkinson 

With the approach of the European Parliament elections in May and the General Election in 2015, the first debate between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage has reignited the debate about the UK’s role in Europe. The debate itself was, perhaps unsurprisingly, dominated by statistical claims and emotional rhetoric.

The UKIP leader toyed with the idea of what would happen if there were a referendum today on whether or not to join the EU. In this hypothetical situation, he claimed that the UK would not vote to join the EU owing to the ‘£55 million pounds a day membership fee’ and the fact that 485 million Europeans could move to the UK. The deputy prime minister, by contrast, focused on jobs and cross-border crime cooperation, arguing that Britain would be ‘better off in Europe – richer, stronger, safer’.

The popularity of both contrasting claims – and thus the ‘winner’ of the debate – seem fairly clear cut: YouGov carried out a post-debate poll, in which Farage stepped out as the winner with 57% of the reported by whereas Clegg only received 36%.

Debate results

This has come on the back of a considerable rise in UKIP’s political fortunes: a Sunday Times survey noted 7% for UKIP in January 2013 – the same period a year later showed a rise to 14%, topped at 17% in May 2013 according to The Sun.

What then could the implications be for the 2015 General Election? Although it is perhaps too early to make any great predictions, it does point to Farage and UKIP having booked a front-row seat in the general election next year and perhaps even more so in the upcoming European Parliament election in May. In the first place, this was a significant opportunity for UKIP to be seen to have the ability, popularity and power to compete with the three major political parties. Farage demonstrated that he is more than capable of facing up to (even facing down) his competition. Also, given that David Cameron and Ed Miliband both declined their invitations to participate in the debate, Farage could claim to be the face of Britain’s Eurosceptics.

The second point is that, despite Clegg’s consistently polished debating skills, Farage’s emotional and sensationalised rhetoric works effectively when discussing divisive issues, such as immigration. Apart from relating the debate to jobs and ‘the place of Britain in the world’, Clegg took a risk in holding onto the ‘Little England v Great Britain’ card and insisting repeatedly that Farage’s claims were based on dogma and made-up figures. This was a dangerous manoeuvre as it not only publicised Farage’s political claims on a broader stage but also drew both debaters into a ‘tit for tat’ round of claim and counter-claim. Ultimately, Farage’s ability to play on popular emotions meant that his factual claims garnered greater legitimacy and authority than those of Clegg. The corollary is that, as recent polls have shown, the Liberal Democrats have dropped even further in the polls.

The third point (argued also by the Guardian’s Owen Jones), is that connecting the debate on EU membership to broader issues likely to feature in all four parties’ manifestos in next year’s General Election was an effective way of gaining support both for the European Parliament elections and UKIP more generally. Thus, his oft-repeated claim that the cost of EU membership (‘£55 million a day’) in a recovering economic climate is unfair, particularly amongst those on low incomes, allowed Farage to generate more support not only for the European Parliament election in just two months time but also for next year’s General Election. In an Opinium/Observer poll presented shortly after the first debate, UKIP had increased their stake by one percentage point to 15% whilst the Liberal Democrats remained on 10%.

Yet, the effect of this small change on the popularity of the parties and the impact of this on the upcoming elections is difficult to determine after this first debate alone. The candidates’ performances in the second debate will perhaps shed more light on what the future might hold for the UK in the EU and the 2015 General Election.